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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking phenomena in the contemporary legal
world is the shift toward holding businesses and corporations respon-
Author's Note: Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Psychology, Univer-
sity of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716. Writing was facilitated by grant SES-
8822598 from the National Science Foundation. The author wishes to acknowl-
edge the helpful comments of David Ermann and James Ogloff on a previous
draft.
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sible for harm. Legal theorists and historians maintain that today
business corporations are expected to provide compensation for inju-
ries that in earlier times would have been attributed to individuals or
to fate., Furthermore, criminal charges against businesses and busi-
ness executives are becoming commonplace.2
Despite a good deal of legal scholarship on the shift toward holding
businesses culpable for harms, psychologists have conducted little sys-
tematic research on public views of corporate responsibility. How do
people conceptualize the civil liability or criminal responsibility of
such group entities? Does it differ significantly from the way in which
they conceive of individual responsibility? Under what circumstances
are people likely to hold corporations and other groups, as opposed to
individuals, culpable for harms?
Two serious industrial accidents have put such questions at the top
of the national agenda. In February of 1989, settlement was reached in
litigation over the accidental release of toxic gas from a Union Carbide
plant in Bhopal, India, which caused 3,500 deaths and some 200,000
injuries.3 Considerable legal skirmishing accompanied the selection of
the appropriate venue for the trial. The general belief was that the
United States would be a much more favorable locale for the plaintiffs
than India because of the United States' expansive legal principles
governing corporate liability and the tendency of American juries to
give larger damage awards.4 In the end, it was an Indian court that
ordered Union Carbide to pay $470 million in compensation and
dropped all criminal charges against Union Carbide and its chairman.5
Evaluations of the fairness of the settlement varied. Some believed
that the Indian government had "surrendered before the multina-
tional," and viewed the settlement as "a victory of Union Carbide."6
Others pointed to the considerable difficulties plaintiffs would have
had to overcome in order to prevail at trial, including establishing the
parent company's liability for the Bhopal affiliate, meeting India's
stricter standards of liability and causation, and refuting Union Car-
bide's contention that a disgruntled employee had sabotaged the plant
and caused the disaster.7
Several questions surrounding the accident in Bhopal remain un-
1. See infra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
2. 1 K. BmcKEY, CoRPoRATE CmMaAL LIABnITY 1-8 (1984).
3. Hazarika, Bhopal Payments by Union Carbide Set at $470 Million, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
4. See Lewin, Judge Bars US. Suits on Bhopal: Claims Should Be Heard in India,
He Rules, N.Y. Times, May 13,1986, at D1, col. 6; Whose Justice for Bhopal?, N.Y.
Times, May 14, 1986, at A26, col. 1.
5. Hazarika, supra note 3.
6. Id. at D3, col. 3.
7. Labaton, Bhopal Outcome: Trial Is Avoided, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D3, col.
1.
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answered. By what country's rules should Union Carbide have been
judged? Was the resulting settlement of the Indian court just? What
are the limits of a parent company's responsibility for the operation of
its subordinate entities? Would the company have been liable for
damages even if the actions of an individual employee precipitated the
toxic gas leak?
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground off
the coast of Alaska.8 The resulting eleven million gallon oil spill in-
jured and killed massive numbers of wildlife and caused substantial
environmental damage to Alaska's coastline.9 Early news stories
stated that the ship's captain had apparently been asleep at the time of
the disaster, and speculated that alcohol may have played a role.lO Re-
ports stated that Exxon was aware that the captain had a history of
alcohol abuse and that he had undergone treatment. 1
The discussion and debate in the press quickly moved from scruti-
nizing the personal peccadillos of the captain to focusing on the re-
sponsibility of Exxon.' 2 Some officials have conceded that even
though Exxon will spend over a billion dollars on the cleanup,
Alaska's coastline cannot be restored to its pre-spill state.13 If Exxon
cannot make the community whole again, what should the company
do to compensate for damage of this magnitude? As of July 1989, 143
8. Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska,
N.Y. Times, March 25, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
9. See, e.g., Browne, In Once-Pristine Sound, Wildlife Reels Under Oil's Impact,
N.Y. Times, April 4, 1989, at C1, col. 1.
10. Shabecoff, Captain of Tanker Had Been Drinking, Blood Tests Show, N.Y. Times,
March 31, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
11. See, e.g., Alcohol and the Big Spill, N.Y. Times, April 17, 1989, at A18, col. 1.
12. See, e.g., Deutsch, The Giant With a Black Eye, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1989, § 3
(Business), at 1, col. 2; Shabecoff, Oil Industry Rebuked as Senate Hearings Begin
in Alaska Oil Spill, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1989, at B8, col. 1. Even articles about
Captain Hazelwood's alcohol problem discussed Exxon's responsibility for reha-
bilitation and supervision of employees who abuse alcohol and drugs. Consider
this New York Times editorial, which pointed the finger at the company: "What
is clear is that Exxon mishandled an employee with an alcohol problem. Exxon is
not alone. Too many businesses have firm policies but inadequate procedures for
dealing with alcohol and drugs." Supra note 11.
13. "No amount of money will make Prince William Sound look as it did before the
disaster. Now officials are in the tough position of having to decide when Exxon
has done all that it can reasonably be expected to do." Wald, What Exxon Will
Be Leaving Behind, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1989, § 4 (The Week in Review) at 7, col.
1. For a more positive view of Exxon's efforts, see Exxon Corporation President
Lee Raymond's letter to the New York Times:
Exxon accepted responsibility for the tragic accident the day it oc-
curred.... Those who were in Alaska and saw [our cleanup] effort with
their own eyes liken it to a mini D-Day. I submit to you that few organi-
zations, private or public, could have done what Exxon did in the same
period of time.
Raymond, Exxon Cleanup Looked Like a Mini D-Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2,1989, at
A18, col. 4.
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separate lawsuits had been filed against Exxon for spill damage.14 Do
civil lawsuits constitute an appropriate sanction and a sufficient deter-
rent? Or do Exxon's actions contributing to the oil disaster rise to the
level of criminal culpability?' 5
The Bhopal and Exxon cases raise a tangled web of issues pertain-
ing to the responsibilities of business and corporate entities. Although
numerous sociologists, political scientists, and philosophers have re-
flected upon, studied and written about the problem of corporate re-
sponsibility, psychologists have been virtually silent on the topic. Yet
many matters-public attitudes toward corporate responsibility, risk-
taking within a corporate environment, the effective deterrence of po-
tential wrongdoers-entail psychological assumptions and concerns.
For scholars working at the interface of psychology and law, who
study how law influences and is affected by individuals, groups, and
the social environment, the topic of corporate responsibility is espe-
cially pertinent.
This article examines psycholegal aspects of corporate responsibil-
ity for wrongdoing, focusing in particular on public attitudes toward
the responsibilities of corporations for harm caused by the corpora-
tions. The article draws on psychological theory and method to study
the factors that lead people to hold corporations culpable for harms.
One aim of the article is to begin to develop a systematic account of
such judgment processes. Other purposes are to demonstrate the ad-
vances in knowledge about corporate wrongdoing that could be gained
by incorporating psycholegal research and theory, and to draw the at-
tention of psycholegal scholars to this fertile and inreasingly impor-
tant area of study.
II. CASES INVOLVING BUSINESSES AND CORPORATIONS:
AN INCREASING PART OF THE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE
The Union Carbide and Exxon cases are but two examples of the
growing presence of corporations in the legal landscape. According to
legal scholars, there has been a long term shift in legal rules and socie-
tal norms regarding the responsibility of businesses to compensate
those individuals who have suffered from business-related injuries.16
For example, nineteenth century America presented a far less sup-
14. Martinez, Exon Profits Plunge After Spill, The Wilmington News-Journal, July
25, 1989, at B8, col. 2.
15. Labaton, Does an Assault on Nature Make Exxon a Criminal?, N.Y. Times, April
23, 1989, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 1, col. 4.
16. E.g., L. FRiEDmAN, A HisTORY OF AmERICAN LAW 177-201, 467-87 (2d ed. 1985);
Black, Compensation and the Social Structure of Misfortune, 21 LAw & SOC'Y.
REV. 563 (1987)(trend away from individual liability to-organizational liability
conforms to theory that liability varies directly with social distance).
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portive environment for injured workers than that which exists in
contemporary times. In 1850, an individual harmed on the job had dif-
ficulty obtaining compensation. If the person was contributorily negli-
gent, or if a fellow worker's actions caused the injury, a lawsuit against
the company was unlikely to succeed. Bars to recovery from busi-
nesses included the fellow servant rule,17 an expansive assumption of
risk doctrine,' 8 and a strict doctrine of contributory negligence. 19 As a
result, it was largely the workers, and not the companies, who bore
the brunt of most business-related personal injuries.
A variety of factors led to legal changes that placed greater respon-
sibility upon business.20 The vast number of industrial accidents com-
bined with sympathetic judges and juries to create a social and legal
climate in which the fellow servant rule was abolished and assumption
of risk and contributory negligence doctrines were modified to permit
partial recovery for injured workers. The Progressive Movement and
the New Deal were accompanied by broad social and attitudinal shifts,
which contributed to expectations that collective entities such as gov-
ernments and businesses had the responsibility to compensate for
harms. The introduction of workers' compensation cemented business
responsibility for most worker injuries. Analyzing these and other
changes in legal rules and social norms, Donald Black noted the strik-
ing shift toward reliance upon collective sources of responsibility such
as business organizations. 21
The century-long movement toward greater business liability ac-
celerated from the 1960s to the 1980s. According to Friedman, the
consumer, environmental, and civil rights movements during these de-
cades helped to raise public anticipation of fair treatment and full
17. The fellow servant rule prohibited recovery from an employer if the injury was
caused by a coworker's negligence. See, e.g., Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R.
Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). Because many on-the-job injuries resulted
from coworker negligence, and coworkers were typically unable to provide ade-
quate compensation, most worker injuries went uncompensated. Friedman &
Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 CoLuM. L. REv.
50 (1967).
18. Nineteenth century workers were typically held to have assumed the risks or
dangers associated with their employment, especially if they were aware of the
dangers. Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co., 177 Mass. 144, 58 N.E. 585 (1900).
See the discussion of assumption of risk doctrine in R. EPSTEIN, C. GREG-ORY, & H.
KALVEN, JR,, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 467-81 (4th ed. 1984).
19. Contributory negligence refers to conduct on the part of the plaintiff which con-
tributes or leads to his or her injury. An example would be the plaintiff's smok-
ing habits in an asbestos case. In contemporary law, contributory negligence
usually operates to lessen the defendant's liability and consequently lower the
plaintiff's award. However, in the nineteenth century, evidence of a plaintiff's
contributory negligence was a complete defense, precluding any award. See R.
EPTEIN, C. GREGORY, & H. KALVEN, supra note 18, at 439-67.
20. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 17.
21. Black, supra note 16, at 576-80.
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compensation for undeserved suffering, creating a contemporary legal
culture of "total justice" expectations. 22 James Coleman has argued
that the growth in the numbers and power of corporations created an
asymmetric society, which in turn led to attempts to redress the bal-
ance between individuals and corporations. 23 Reflecting on the cen-
tury-long shift, he writes that "the principle of caveat emptor, let the
buyer beware, in a social structure which was not asymmetric between
buyers and sellers, has been replaced, in the asymmetric society, with
sharp restriction of the seller's rights and expansion of the means of
redress for persons."24
Attitudinal transformations in expectations for compensation for
undeserved suffering paralleled or preceded new legal rules providing
for greater business responsibility. From the 1960s to the 1980s,
businesses were increasingly held civilly liable for injuries with which
they were associated.23 Changes in product liability laws, particularly
strict liability for defective products,26 not to mention market share
liability,27 increased the likelihood of lawsuits and recoveries against
businesses.28 Criminal charges against corporations have also
increased.2 9
In addition to new legal doctrines and practices and public expecta-
tions about business compensation for individual suffering, businesses
appear to be using civil litigation to resolve disputes among themselves
with greater frequency. In 1963, Stewart Macaulay published an influ-
ential study of dispute resolution in the business world, which showed
that large manufacturers were quite reluctant to employ the courts to
resolve their disputes.30 Recently, however, Marc Galanter 3 ' has re-
22. L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JusncE (1985). See also J. LiEBERmAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCI-
ETY (1981)(increasing use of judicial standards to resolve disputes reflects inabil-
ity of legislatures to implement, by means of specific rules, a collectivist policy of
compensating all injuries).
23. J. COLEMAN, THE Asymim= c Sociry (1982).
24. Id. at 22.
25. R. EPsTEIN, C. GREGORY, & H. KALVEN, supra note 18; Bush, Between Two
Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causa-
tion of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1473, 1480-86 (1986).
26. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897,27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
27. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
28. See G. EADs & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES
TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 13-51 (1983); Priest, The Invention
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Mod-
ern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
29. 1 K. BRCKEY, supra note 2, at 1-8.
30. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am.
Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
31. Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Si*; or, The Federal Courts Since the
Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 921.
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ported data indicating significant increases over the last two decades
in federal court filings in a variety of forms of commercial litigation,
including contract disputes, intellectual property litigation, and bank-
ruptcy cases.3 2 In some jurisdictions, juries are deciding more business
cases as well. Peterson analyzed state and federal jury trials in Cook
County, Illinois and San Francisco, California, from 1960 to 1984.33
Jury trials in business/contract cases increased notably over the two
decades in both jurisdictions.3 4
Despite the overall trend toward greater business presence and lia-
bility in the courts, there have been concerted efforts to limit business
liability in recent years. During the tort reform movement of the
1980s, tort reform working groups called for changes that in many in-
stances would limit the liability of collective entities. For example,
the Tort Policy Working Group of the U. S. Attorney General recom-
mended that manufacturers not be held liable for unknown hazards of
their products, that joint and several liability be abolished, and that
non-economic damages be limited to $100,000.35 An American Bar As-
sociation Committee recommended modification of the joint and sev-
eral liability doctrine, which was perceived to work to the
disadvantage of large resource-rich businesses.36 Insurance and busi-
ness groups successfully lobbied state legislatures to enact laws limit-
ing business liability and damages.3 7 Overall, however, from both long
range and short term perspectives, questions of business and corporate
responsibility are more likely than ever before to be adjudicated in the
courts.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT
CORPORATE WRONGDOING
Case law and model rules contain legal templates for responsibility
within corporate and business groups-the liability of directors, share-
holders, management, and so on. Model Penal Code provisions re-
32. Id. at 925.
33. M. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980S: TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS IN CALIFORNIA
AND COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS (1987).
34. Id. at 11.
35. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AvAILABiLrrY AND AFFORDABILIrY 60-75
(1986).
36. AcTION COMUSSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, AM. BAR ASs'N,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 20-25 (1987). For an excellent discussion of
the contemporary tort reform movement, see RABIN, Some Reections on the
Process of Tort Reform, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 13 (1988). Rabin served as the re-
porter to the ABA Commission.
37. Hilder, Tort Wars: Insurers' Push to Limit Civil Damage Awards Begins to Slow
Down, Wall Street J., Aug. 1, 1986, at Al, col. 6 (describes state actions to limit
liability claims, but argues that the new laws are not likely to provide substantial
benefits to insurers or consumers).
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garding corporate liability have been published.35 The drafters
recommended holding corporations liable under a restricted range of
circumstances, usually when offensive conduct is performed or au-
thorized by officers of the corporation.39 Yet the federal courts have
adopted a much more expansive view of corporate liability, even hold-
ing corporations liable for misbehavior by subordinates acting against
the express instructions of superiors.40 Which of these sets of respon-
sibility rules for corporate liability come closest to matching lay no-
tions of responsibility?
Given the emergence of legal theories of corporate liability and ex-
tensive analysis of relevant cases in law reviews, there is surprisingly
little systematic theoretical work in psychology on attitudes toward
group and corporate responsibility. Scholarly analyses of corporate re-
sponsibility often imply that attitudinal shifts among judges and mem-
bers of the public account for changes in legal doctrine and practices. 4'
Yet there is no explicit documentation or thorough understanding of
the content and structure of these attitudes nor the nature and impact
of such attitudinal shifts. What are the public's views of the responsi-
bility of groups such as businesses and corporations? What shapes and
influences these views? What knowledge does psychology have to
contribute to our understanding of these judgments of responsibility?
Before considering these questions, it is important to recount the
theoretical and practical justifications for studying public views of cor-
porate responsibility. Psychologists have studied the links between at-
titudes and other behavior for many years. A substantial amount of
that work has examined when the expression of attitudes will or will
not be associated with related behavior.42 Sometimes there is a posi-
tive relationship between attitudes and behavior, but under other cir-
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See Brickey, Rethink-
ing Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 593 (1987).
39. As Brickey summarizes, the Code would hold a corporation accountable for mis-
conduct by agents under the following conditions:
(1) the offense is a minor infraction; (2) the offense is defined by a
statute that expresses a clear legislative intent to hold corporations lia-
ble for the acts of their agents generally;, (3) the offense consists of non-
feasance; or (4) the offense is performed, authorized or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or a high managerial agent acting on
behalf of the corporation and within the scope of his employment.
1 K. BRICKEY, supra note 2, at 47 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 46, 54-58.
41. See Friedman, supra note 22; Bush, supra note 25. In contrast, Priest, supra note
28, at 463-64, gives little weight to social factors, instead ascribing changes in tort
doctrine to shifts in tort law scholarship within the academic community.
42. A classic article is Wicker, Attitudes versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal
and Overt Behavioral Responses to Attitude Objects, 25 J. Soc. IssuEs 41 (1969).
See generally ATrruDEs AND BEHAVIOR (K. Thomas ed. 1971); I. AJZEN & M.
FISHBEIN, UNDERSTANDING ATTIUDEs AND PREDICTING SocIAL BEHAVIOR (1980).
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cumstances the linkages are more ephemeral.43
It is thus worth noting that public attitudes do appear to influence
substantive law and legal procedure both directly and indirectly. Leg-
islators respond to shifts in public attitudes by enacting new laws.44
Potential plaintiffs base their decisions to bring lawsuits on their defi-
nitions of wrongdoing,45 while prosecutors consider public attitudes in
deciding whether to charge someone with a crime.46 Public opinion
can also influence judicial selection.47 Legal Realists have long argued
that judicial interpretation is affected not only by fidelity to legal doc-
43. See I. AJZEN & M. FIsHBEIN, supra note 42, for an analysis of when the relation-
ship between expressed attitudes and actual behavior will be strongest.
44. Converse, Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process, 51
PUB. OPINION Q. S12 (1987); Page & Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,
77 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 175 (1983)(showing links between shifts in public opinion
and legislative change). Contra Gibson, Political Intolerance and Political Re-
pression During the McCarthy Red Scare, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 511 (1988). Gib-
son showed that although there was a positive relationship between mass public
intolerance and the adoption of repressive laws by the states during the McCar-
thy era, the relationship between elite intolerance and legal repression was
stronger. Other analyses indicated that variation in elite opinion (but not mass
public opinion) was linked to the passage of repressive legislation. Gibson con-
cluded that although there is no simple relationship between mass opinion and
law passage, mass "[o]pinion is important in the policy process because it delimits
the range of acceptable policy alternatives." Id. at 522.
45. The dispute resolution literature shows that people first define or "name" a dis-
pute, then assign blame, and then decide whether or not to pursue the claim in
court. Thus people's subjective views of the wrongfulness of events or actions are
critically important to their decisions to go forward with lawsuits. Felstiner,
Abel, & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blam-
ing, Claiming. . ., 15 LAw & Soc'Y. REv. 631 (1980-81). People vary in their defini-
tions of when a dispute has occurred, and in their willingness to bring disputes to
court. Vidmar & Schuller, Individual Differences and the Pursuit of Legal
Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 299 (1987)(documenting
differences among individuals in the extent to which they perceive disputes and
act upon legal claims).
46. J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1980); Pritch-
ard, Homicide and Bargained Justice: The Agenda-Setting Effect of Crime News
on Prosecutors, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 143 (1986).
47. In 23 states, most or all judges are elected by the public, while in 18 others the
public votes in judicial retention elections. AMIcAN COURT SYSTEMS 281 (S.
Goldman & A. Sarat 2d ed. 1989). For discussion of problems with popular elec-
tion of judges see Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146
(1988); Wold & Culver, The Defeat of the Cai fornia Justices: The Campaign, The
Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987),
who found in opinion surveys that voters considered the California Supreme
Court Justices' alleged leniency toward criminal defendants generally and the
death penalty in particular as important factors in their decision to vote against
retention for the justices. Furthermore, even though the public does not vote on
federal judicial appointments, public opinion concerning the unsuccessful U.S.
Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork was reported to have influenced the confir-
mation process. See Bloustein, Did the "Bork Case" Change the Meaning of Our
Constitution?, 72 JuDICATURE 145 (1988).
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trine but also by the judges' attitudes.48 And perceptions of the legiti-
macy of the legal system affect compliance with the law.49
The public's influence is most directly observed in the institution
of the jury, whose verdicts reflect community sentiments.50 Jury ver-
dicts in turn have multiple influences on the operation of the civil and
criminal justice systems.51 Therefore, the study of lay views of law is
critical to understanding the broader interrelationships among law
and social institutions. As legal doctrine and public policy on corpo-
rate wrongdoing continue to develop, public attitudes are certain to
play a critical role in shaping the law. Psychological theory and re-
search methodology could make important contributions to an under-
standing of how people evaluate corporate and business responsibility
in the changing legal landscape.
IV. SOURCES OF DISTINCTIVE RESPONSES TO CORPORATE
WRONGDOING
A. Attitudes toward Businesses and Corporations
In exploring determinants of public reaction to corporate wrongdo-
ing, one of the first matters to consider is the role of individual atti-
tudes toward business. Such attitudes might well influence the
perception and treatment of business and corporate wrongdoing. Pro-
business or anti-business attitudes, coupled with beliefs about the ap-
propriate role business should play in compensation for harms, may
predispose members of the public toward particular views of business
wrongdoing. As with the study of other attitudes and related behav-
iors, simply because positive or negative attitudes are expressed does
not mean that people will behave in corresponding ways under all cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless the probability of congruent behavior
makes it worthwhile to examine the content of public opinion about
business.
The public shows a curious schizophrenia in its attitudes toward
48. See, eg., Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431 (1930). Llewellyn argued for the study of the behavior of judges, contrasting
the "paper rules" of law with actual judicial behavior.
49. T. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (1990) (showing that people are more will-
ing to comply with law if they view legal and political authorities as legitimate
and fair).
50. V. HANs & N. VMMAI, JUDGING THE JURY (1986); H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE
AMERIcAN JURY (1966); S. KAssN & L. WRIGHT mAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL (1988); R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITs ROLE IN AMERICAN SOcIETY (1980). For a
discussion of how jury decision making might be influenced by jurors' attitudes
toward business see Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrong-
doing, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (in press).
51. Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury and the "Litigation Explo-
sion", in THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY 15 (Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers
Foundation 1987).
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business. There is no question that the majority of the American pub-
lic is supportive of business in the abstract. Most members of the pub-
lic believe that business makes valuable contributions to the welfare
of society and is generally beneficial. For instance, 86% of the respon-
dents in one public opinion poll said that they viewed business favora-
bly.52 Respondents asked to rank major institutions in society placed
business and industry behind the churches, but ahead of educational
institutions, the press, and the United States Supreme Court.5 3 In a
May 1989 Business Week/Harris poll, 62% of the respondents agreed
that American business should be given a majority of the credit for the
prosperity that has prevailed during most of the 1980s.M Six out of ten
of these respondents rated the overall performance of American cor-
porations as "excellent" or "pretty good."55
However, surveys show equally strong and widely shared views
about the down side of American business. People fear the concentra-
tion of power and have low regard for the ethics of corporate execu-
tives.5 6 In a 1986 New York Times survey respondents were asked:
"There's been a lot of news recently about individuals and corpora-
tions committing white collar crimes to make a profit for themselves
and their companies. How often do you think this happens in Ameri-
can business?" Fifty-six percent of the respondents thought that it
happened "very often." 57 In another poll 55% of the respondents de-
scribed most corporate executives as "not honest."58 Significant num-
bers of the respondents surveyed in the Business Week/Harris Poll
believed that business would engage in a variety of harmful activities
to turn a profit, including harming the environment (47%), endanger-
ing public health (38%), selling unsafe products (37%), putting work-
ers' health and safety at risk (42%), and deliberately charging inflated
52. Roper & Miller, Americans Take Stock of Business, 8 PuB. OPINION 12 (1985).
53. Id.
54. The Public is Willing to Take Business On, Bus. WK., May 29, 1989, at 29.
55. Id. See also S. LiPsET & W. SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BusINEss, LABOR,
AND GovERNmiENT 285-89 (rev. ed. 1987) for a summary of other survey findings
that demonstrate strong general support for free enterprise.
56. Negativity toward corporations has a long history. Writing about American anti-
corporate sentiment during the early years of the nineteenth century, Friedman
observes that:
The word "soulless" constantly recurs in debates over corporations.
Everyone knew that corporations were really run by human beings. Yet
the metaphor was not entirely pointless. Corporations did not die, and
had no ultimate limit to their size. There were no natural bounds to
their life or to their greed. Corporations, it was feared, could concen-
trate the worst urges of whole groups of men; the economic power of a
corporation would not be tempered by the mentality of any one person,
or by considerations of family or morality.
L. Friedman, supra note 16, at 194.
57. Opinion Roundup, 9 PUB. OPINION 22 (1986).
58. Id.
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prices (62%).59 Perhaps because they were concerned about the dele-
terious consequences of concentrated authority, seven out of ten of
these respondents agreed that "business has gained too much power
over too many aspects of American life."60
It has long been asserted that, when it comes to sanctions for
harmdoing, businesses and corporations are treated more leniently
than ordinary folk. For a number of years, academic scholars vigor-
ously debated whether or not big business was advantaged, and
whether official as well as public reactions toward corporate wrongdo-
ing were excessively lenient.61 In Schrager and Short's classic theo-
retical article on organizational crime, they noted the existence of the
belief in excessive tolerance and speculated that if it existed it might
be due to the diffuse, economic harm characteristic of most business
wrongdoing, compared to the focused bodily harm of some individual
crime.6 2
Sociological studies of crime seriousness ratings put the argument
that corporations and businesses are treated leniently to the test. By
asking respondents to rate the seriousness of a large number of differ-
ent crimes (some more characteristic of "street crime," and others typ-
ical of "suite crime"), researchers were able to examine the rankings
for evidence of systematic tolerance of corporate crime.63 This work
failed to discover evidence of leniency toward business crime. In
Iichael Levi's thoughtful review of the research findings, he noted
that white-collar crimes involving actual or even potential physical
harm were judged very seriously by the public.64 The evidence thus
on the whole supportedSchrager and Short's insight that it was the
nature of the wrongdoing rather than the favorable position of busi-
ness that contributed to apparent public tolerance of business
wrongdoing.
There is some evidence that public attitudes toward business have
59. The Public is Willing to Take Business On, supra note 54.
60. Id.
61. See, ag., E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION (1983)(orig-
inal publication in 1949 as WHITE-COLLAR CRIME).
62. Schrager & Short, Toward a Sociology of Organizational Cime, 25 Soc. PROBS.
407 (1978).
63. Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and
Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REv. 224 (1974); Schrager & Short, How Seri-
ous a Crime? Perceptions of Common and Organizational Crimes, in WHITE-COL-
LAR CRIME: THEORY AND RESEARCH 14-31 (G. Gels & E. Stotland ed.
1980)(reanalyzing Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk's 1974 data); Wolfgang & Figlio,
Weighing Social Responsibility: How Perceptions Differ for Individual and Cor-
porate Crimes, 1985 WHARTON ANN. 32 (1985); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, P.
TRACY, & S. SINGER, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice 1985).
64. M. LEVI, REGULATING FRAUD: WHITF-COLLAR CRIME AND THE CRimiNAL PRO-
CESS 59-64 (1987).
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taken a negative turn in recent years. Francis Cullen, William
Maakestad, and Gray Cavender maintain that social and political
events of the 1970s and 1980s undermined public confidence in major
institutions and led the public to become increasingly willing to sanc-
tion those in power.6 5 Indeed, Lipset and Schneider reviewed survey
evidence and discovered a decrease in general public support for big
business and business leaders.66 Compared to earlier times, Ameri-
cans are now less confident in business.
It would be tempting to conclude that identifiable pro-business or
anti-business subgroups exist in the population. Although people
clearly differ in their views toward business, such a unidimensional
explanation is too simplistic and fails to account for the intricacies of
the data from different polls. The divergent views of business appar-
ent in public opinion polling suggest that attitudes toward business are
complex and multidimensional.67 Individuals appear to evaluate busi-
ness along a variety of dimensions, and persist in holding seemingly
contradictory cognitions about its merits.
B. Distinctive Features of Businesses and Corporations
1. Individuals versus Corporations
Independent of general attitudes toward business, a number of fea-
tures of the typical business or corporation exist that may have impor-
tant effects on judgments of wrongdoing. Several characteristics
differentiate the typical corporation and the typical individual. As
noted above, violations of corporations and individuals frequently dif-
fer: The focused bodily harm associated with street crime offenses by
individuals elicits more punitive reactions than the diffuse economic
harm characteristic of much corporate wrongdoing. On the other
hand, because of matters of scale, corporations often possess the po-
tential to harm more people. As the crime seriousness studies demon-
strate, the greater the harm-even the potential harm-the more
punitive the reaction.68
Corporations also typically tend to have greater financial resources
than individuals. A number of commentators have claimed that per-
ceptions of ample financial resources may activate the "deep pockets"
effect, whereby juries increase the awards of plaintiffs suing corpora-
65. F. CULLEN, W. MAAKESTAD, & G. CAVENDER, CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK
(1987).
66. S. LIPSET & W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55.
67. Roper & Miller, supra note 52, agree with this assessment. Writing in 1985 about
public opinion concerning business, they concluded that "the public (or most of it
at least) didn't hate business ten years ago and doesn't love business now. The
public's attitudes toward business... are complex and ambivalent." Id. at 15.
68. M. LEVI, supra note 64, at 60. See generally Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, supra
note 63; M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, P. TRACY, & S. SINGER supra note 63.
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tions because they believe that the corporate deep pockets can afford
it.69
Businesses and corporations may also possess superior resources in
nonfinancial arenas. Corporations are organized in a hierarchical
structure, and populated by individuals with specialized skills and re-
sponsibilities. There may exist a presumption that the corporation,
with all of these intellectual resources, can function in a more
thoughtful, forward-looking way than the individual.
Related to this is the fact that a corporation is a group rather than
one individual. Judgments about group and individual responsibility
are likely to differ. Individuals may readily empathize with other in-
dividuals but find it difficult to do so with corporations.7 0 Further-
more, psychological research studies suggest that groups will be
attributed greater responsibility, on the whole, than similarly situated
individuals, particularly for events with serious consequences. Several
studies have demonstrated that more responsibility is attributed to an
individual whose actions lead to a severe as opposed to a mild out-
come.7 1 When extreme events occur, people tend to infer that sub-
stantial causes (or "multiple necessary causes," in the language of
attribution theory) must have been present. Therefore, in the face of
an extremely negative event, people may search for group rather than
individual level causes. In studying why conspiracy theories of presi-
dential assassinations are so popular, McCauley and Jacques con-
cluded that groups are seen as more effective than individuals, and
thus more capable of successfully assassinating a nation's chief
69. P. HUBER, LIABmLTY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
See also infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text (discussion of deep pockets).
70. Shaver writes:
A perceiver who can imagine being in the actor's circumstances is more
'familiar' with the setting, and consequently more likely to understand
the constraints on action. In the same fashion, a perceiver who is person-
ally similar to the actor will be better able to take that actor's viewpoint
K. SHaVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, REsPONsIBILrrY, AND
BLAMEWORTHINESS 135 (1985). But see Lerner & Miller, Just World Research
and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL.
1030 (1978)(reviewing research showing that the belief in a just world may create
defensive judgments, whereby observers blame highly similar crime victims for
their own misfortune).
71. See, e.g., Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. PERSONAL-
rry & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 73 (1966). But see Shaver, Defensive Attribution: Effects
of Severity and Relevance on the Responsibilityfor Accidents, 14 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 101 (1970), which failed to replicate this effect. For discus-
sions of the empirical literature examining the severity effect see Fincham & Jas-
pars, Attribution of Responsibility: From Man the Scientist to Man as Lawyer, in
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY (L. Berkowitz ed. 1980); Karlovac
& Darley, Attribution of Responsibility for Accidents: A Negligence Law Anal-
ogy, 6 Soc. COGNrrION 287 (1988).
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officer.72
Some evidence that corporate and business groups are treated dif-
ferently than individuals for comparable behaviors comes from a Rand
Corporation study of jury verdicts in Cook County, Illinois, during the
1960s and 1970s. 73 In cases involving severely injured plaintiffs, corpo-
rate and governmental defendants were more likely to be held liable
for injuries and to be assessed larger compensatory damage awards
than individual defendants.74 Curiously, such effects were not found
for moderately injured plaintiffs.75
There are a number of potential explanations for this pattern of
results. One is that juries were motivated by their perceptions of the
"deep pockets" of the defendant, and determined the awards based in
part on their assumptions about the greater financial resources of cor-
porate and governmental defendants. But alternative explanations
cannot be ruled out. The cases brought against individuals and against
businesses may not have been comparable in important ways. Settle-
ment practices, legal theories about defendant liability, the number of
claims within a lawsuit, or the types of injuries may have all differed.
These different features of the cases may have contributed to the ver-
dicts and higher awards.76
More direct evidence that corporations elicit judgments of wrong-
doing that are distinct from the judgments of individuals is contained
in an experimental study.77 The study examined whether, even if cor-
porations engaged in the same behaviors, they would be judged differ-
ently than individuals. The authors developed a scenario in which
some workers were harmed by clearing debris from an empty lot. The
debris was later found to include toxic waste. Respondents were
asked to evaluate and judge the responsibility of the key actors in the
scenario. Half the respondents read a scenario in which the workers
were hired by a "Mr. Jones," while the other half read the otherwise
identical scenario in which the workers were hired by the "Jones
Corporation."
72. McCauley & Jacques, The Popularity of Conspiracy Theories of Presidential As-
sassination: A Bayesian Analysis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 637
(1979). This helps to explain the focus on the Exxon Corporation rather than the
tanker captain in assigning responsibility for the massive Alaskan oil spill. See
supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
73. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK
CouNTY JURY TRIALS (1985).
74. Id. at Table 4.4 (liability), Table 4.5 (median awards), and Figure 4.1 (expected
median awards).
75. Id.
76. Id. See R. MACCOUN, GETING INSIDE THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER UN-
DERSTANDING OF CIVIL JURY BEHAVIOR 34-36 (1987) (presents an interesting dis-
cussion of various explanations for defendant identity effects).
77. Hans & Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW
& Hum. BEHAV. 151 (1989).
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The results of the experiment were dramatic. Respondents who
read the Jones Corporation version were significantly more likely to
hold the defendant morally and legally responsible for the workers'
injuries from clearing the toxic waste than respondents who read the
Mr. Jones version. Respondents saw the corporation as more reckless,
more likely to have known beforehand that the workers might be
harmed, and more blameworthy.78
Respondents in the study were also asked for their judgments of
the civil liability and criminal responsibility of Jones for the events.
They found the Jones Corporation more civilly and criminally culpa-
ble than Mr. Jones. Compensatory awards to the plaintiffs suing the
Jones Corporation were significantly greater than the awards to plain-
tiffs suing Mr. Jones.79
Additional analyses led the authors to attribute these results to the
respondent's greater expectations of the corporation rather than to re-
spondents' perceptions of the "deep pockets" of the corporation.8 0 In
multiple regression analyses, the investigators attempted to determine
to what extent the respondents' judgments of civil liability, criminal
culpability, and award could be predicted from their perceptions of the
defendant's recklessness, the defendant's financial resources, harm to
the workers, and the probability of deterrence. The most important
factor underlying judgments of criminal and civil culpability was the
respondent's perception of the defendant's recklessness. The authors
concluded that:
respondents made assessments of recklessness within the specific context of
individual or corporate misbehavior, apparently applying a different standard
of care to the two types of actors. Those recklessness judgments then deter-
mined their decisions about criminal and civil culpability and the total award.
Other considerations such as financial resources and deterrence appeared to
play only a modest independent role.81
The overall pattern of results from the experiment thus appeared
to indicate that respondents had higher expectations of the corporate
defendant than of the individual. Whether the greater expectations
stemmed from an alternative standard for evaluating corporate re-
sponsibility or from prejudice against corporations could not be deter-
mined.82 Current research is attempting to tease out the factors that
produced this effect.83 It does appear that, for a variety of reasons, the
78. Id. at 158.
79. Id. at 157. The average total award to the Mr. Jones plaintiffs was $151,584,
whereas the average total award to the Jones Corporation plaintiffs was $247,610.
Id.
80. Id. at 159-61.
81. Id. at 161 (emphasis deleted).
82. Id. at 163.
83. The National Science Foundation funded two research programs in 1989 on lay
judgments of corporate responsibility- V. HANS, PUBLIc VIEWS OF CORPORATE RE-
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responsibility of corporate and individual litigants is judged in diver-
gent ways.
2. Differences Among Businesses and Corporations
The issue of differences among corporations is closely related to
the above discussion comparing individuals with corporations. As peo-
ple judge responsibility, what factors of corporations are important?
For example, do judgments about responsibility issues in large busi-
ness enterprises differ fundamentally from judgments about culpabil-
ity in smaller businesses?
From a psychological perspective, the size of a business organiza-
tion is likely to create distinctive reactions.84 It may be easier for indi-
viduals to empathize with smaller companies, particularly those run
by identifiable individuals (such as sole proprietorships or family-
owned businesses) than larger, more faceless, highly bureaucratic or-
ganizations. Financial resources of smaller companies may be more
modest, and expectations for compensation for harmdoing may be cor-
respondingly more moderate. The nonfinancial resources of small
corporations are likely to be modest as well, and thus may not trigger
the seemingly higher expectations of corporate behavior found in the
Jones Corporation experiment. Finally, the fear of concentrated
power of big business evident in the public opinion polls85 is unlikely
to be aroused by small companies. For all these reasons, reactions to
the wrongdoing of small corporations may be more similar to reactions
to wrongdoing by individuals than to judgments of the harmdoing of
large corporations.
These hypotheses about the impact of organizational size receive
some support from public opinion data that show smaller companies
are evaluated more positively than larger companies. In a 1985 poll,
93% of the respondents rated small business companies favorably,
compared to 71% who gave favorable ratings to large business
corporations. 86
In addition to size, a specific corporation's reputation and the popu-
larity or social utility of the product that a company manufactures
SPONSIBILITY FOR WRONGDOING; R. MAccoUN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL JURY VER-
DICTS IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES.
84. Size has been the focus of a number of social psychological theories and research
studies. Latane posits that group size is one of the key variables determining how
much impact a group will have. Latane, The Psychology of Social Impact, 36 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIST 343, 344 (1981). Researchers have undertaken a number of studies
of the effects of a group's size. See, e.g., D. KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PsY-
CHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 106-18 (2d. ed. 1978); S. WILSON, INFORMAL GROUPS
16-18 (1978); Zander, The Psychology of Group Processes, in 30 ANN. REV. OF PSY-
CHOLOGY 417, 44446 (1979).
85. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
86. Roper & Miller, supra note 52, at 12-13.
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could influence judgments in particular cases. Surveys show consis-
tent differences among types of companies in public favorability rat-
ings, with oil and tobacco companies consistently rated most
negatively and food and banking industries rated most positively.8 7
Characteristics associated with positive ratings included perceptions
that the companies were doing a good job serving consumers, that the
companies had concern for public health and well-being, and that the
industry's practices were ethical.8 8 Individual corporations should be
rated favorably to the extent that they have reputations for ethical
practices and good service to consumers and the public.
One question unanswered to date is the extent to which specific
attitudes about individual corporations significantly influence judg-
ments of their wrongdoing. Certainly corporate public relations ef-
forts are based on the presumption that general goodwill will benefit
the corporation if negative events occur. Sociologists David Ermann
and Richard Lundman maintain that organizations work hard to de-
velop positive public views in part to counteract potentially negative
labels.89
The relationship between general attitudes and responsibility judg-
ments should be highest when the content of both converge. 90 The
Jones Corporation study found that respondents' ratings of the ethics
of corporate executives did not correlate with judgments of wrongdo-
ing for the Jones Corporation.91 It is possible that had the study asked
about a characteristic of the corporation that was linked more closely
to the harmdoing (such as care for workers' health and safety), those
evaluations would have been associated with case-specific judgments.
Similarly, estimates of the ethics of corporate executives might be cen-
tral to determinations of corporate fraud.
It would be interesting to vary features of corporations, including
size, resources, product type, and reputation, and test their impact on
judgments of wrongdoing using the Jones Corporation experiment
methodology. The manner in which corporate characteristics influ-
ence responsibility attributions could thus be ascertained.
87. S. LIPsET & W. ScHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 195-97.
88. Id. at 195-96.
89. "Most organizations undertake strenuous efforts to escape deviant labels. They
anticipate attempts at labeling by building reservoirs of good will useful in coun-
tering accusations of deviance." CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE 24
(M. Ermann & R. Lundman 3d ed. 1987). See also Ermann, The Operative Goals
of Corporate Philanthropy: Contributions to the Public Broadcasting SysteM,
1972-1976, 25 Soc. PnoBs. 504 (1978).
90. This would be consistent with studies of attitude-behavior consistency. See I.
AJZEN & M. FISHBEIN, supra note 42.
91. Hans & Ermann, supra note 77, at 163.
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C. Attitudes Toward Personal Versus Social Responsibility
Another factor that affects judgments of business and corporate re-
sponsibility is the tendency to give weight to either individual or social
factors in attributing causation and responsibility. People differ in
their preferences for holding individuals or other factors responsible
for harm. As part of their work on jury selection in civil cases involv-
ing potential wrongdoing by governmental or corporate entities, staff
at the National Jury Project discovered that prospective jurors dif-
fered in the extent to which they held individuals or external condi-
tions responsible for events.92 At one end of the continuum of views is
the "personal responsibility" perspective. Adherents of this approach
tend to attribute success and failure to the individual. They emphasize
motivation, self-reliance, and personal responsibility for events. They
appear to be more likely to blame the victim of a misfortune.
At the other end of the continuum is the "social responsibility"
perspective. Devotees of this approach are more likely to give credit
for events to environmental and social factors. In cases in which indi-
viduals sue businesses, social responsibility adherents may be more
likely to attribute culpability to the business, whereas personal re-
sponsibility adherents may be more likely to focus on what the indi-
vidual could have done to prevent the harm.
Psychologists have labeled the strong tendency for observers to
hold individuals responsible for events with which they are associated
as the "fundamental attribution error."93 As the adjective "funda-
mental" suggests, many members of the public could be described as
personal responsibility adherents. One of the most insightful depic-
tions of such a constellation of attitudes comes from Engel's inter-
views with members of a rural Illinois community.94 Many people
expressed hostility to those who sued others for compensation for per-
sonal injuries. Engel writes:
To the traditional individualists of Sander County, transforming a personal
injury into a claim against someone else was an attempt to escape responsibil-
ity for one's own actions. The psychology of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk had deep roots in the local culture. The critical fact of
personal injuries in most cases was that the victims probably could have pre-
vented them if they had been more careful, even if others were to some degree
at fault.9 5
As Galanter notes, however, negativity toward those who engaged the
law was limited to personal injury suits. Engel's individualists did not
demonstrate hostility to those people involved in lawsuits over con-
92. E. KRAUSS & B. BONORA, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUEs 13-4 to 13-9 (1987).
93. R. NisBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
94. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song. Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 551 (1984).
95. Id. at 559.
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tract violations.96
Just as individuals differ in their preferences for personal or social
responsibility, situations can elicit differential judgments of personal
or social responsibility. In particular, situations characterized by a
substantial degree of personal control by the user of a product should
reduce judgments of corporate responsibility, while instances in which
an individual has little control over how a product is employed should
increase judgments of corporate responsibility. An interesting case in
point involves cigarette company litigation over the harmful effects of
tobacco. Before 1988, tobacco companies successfully defended them-
selves during thiry-six years of lawsuits brought by smokers and their
families who sought compensation for injuries- and death caused by
smoking. Interviews with jurors in some of the trials indicated that
they were reluctant to hold the tobacco companies liable when smok-
ers knew, or should have known, that smoking was harmful to them.97
In 1988, the jury in Cipollone v. Liggett Group9S broke the tobacco
companies' success record. Yet even this plaintiff victory was modest,
and, it turned out, short-lived. The jury awarded money not to the
estate of the smoker whose cancer death was attributed to smoking,
but rather to her widowed husband. Interviews with several of the
jurors who served in Cipollone revealed that at least four of the six
believed that tobacco companies should not be held responsible for the
negative health consequences suffered by those who voluntarily
smoked.99 Furthermore, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals over-
turned the jury verdict in a complicated opinion, thus restoring the
tobacco companies' perfect record.100
One public opinion poll on reactions to the verdict also showed that
the majority of respondents did not believe that the tobacco companies
should be held responsible for smoking injuries. Within two weeks of
the Cipollone jury verdict, I surveyed a convenience sample of 105
Delaware adults about their views of the case. Reactions to the verdict
were split, with 39% supporting and 45% opposing the verdict. Re-
spondents showed strong adherence to a "personal responsibility" per-
spective for smoking. Smokers were seen as fully informed about the
96. Galanter, supra note 31, at 945-46.
Thus, all the horror stories about litigation chronicle outlandish or
predatory tort or civil rights or family claims, but pass over contracts;
they focus on the claims of individuals and ignore those of businesses,
government, or other organizations.
Id. (footnote omitted).
97. Gidmark, The Tobacco Juries-An In-Depth Study, 10 TRIAL Dip. J. 18 (1987).
98. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988).
99. Singer, They Didn't Really Blame the Cigarette Makers, THE AM. L., September
1988, at 31.
100. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 58 U.S.L.W. 2411, 10 UCC Rep.
Serv. 2d. 625 (3d Cir. 1990).
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dangers of smoking; addiction was no excuse. Plaintiffs in tobacco
company lawsuits were perceived as "just trying to blame someone
else for their problems."
It is interesting to speculate about what kind of situation might
lead to judgments of responsibility for the tobacco companies. One
likely situation might be lawsuits over negative health consequences
from passive or second-hand smoke. Because individuals have little
control over the source of the injuries, it is more difficult for observers
to adopt a personal responsibility perspective and to blame the victims.
More generally, whenever individuals are unaware of the potential
dangers of a product and cannot control how the product is employed,
personal responsibility attributions are unlikely and social responsibil-
ity judgments that a business or corporation is culpable should
increase.
The centrality of user knowledge and potential control in judg-
ments of responsibility help to explain the deference in tort law to the
presence and adequacy of warnings in cases involving product injuries.
As a psychologist auditing a torts class at Stanford Law School, I was
perplexed by the emphasis in court decisions over warnings. I knew
(and the cases provided eloquent, frequently tragic support) that peo-
ple often ignored or misread warnings. Why should the presence of an
often demonstrably useless line or two on a product be so critical to a
case's outcome? My notion of a psychologically sophisticated, "ade-
quate" warning was one that effectively deterred dangerous conduct.
However, thinking about warnings in the context of lay judgments of
responsibility puts them in a different light. A warning provides an
opportunity for the user to learn about the potential dangers of a prod-
uct and to make a decision about whether or not and how to use the
product. It thus facilitates the conditions leading to adoption of the
"personal responsibility" perspective-and the judgment that the
user, under the reasonable person test, should have known that the
product was harmful.
D. Judgments of Responsibility within Group Contexts
Determining responsibility for outcomes of group activity is often
extremely difficult. The unsuccessful criminal manslaughter prosecu-
tion stemming from a triple fatality during the filming of Twilight
Zone-The Movie illustrates the nature of the challenge. In that case,
director John Landis and four others stood trial after a helicopter,
damaged by an out-of-control explosion, crashed and took the lives of
actor Victor Morrow and two illegally hired child actors.101 Prosecu-
tion evidence presented at trial indicated numerous ways in which
101. S. FARBER & M. GREEN, OuTRAGEOUS CoNDucT: ART, EGO AND THE TWILIGHT
ZONE CASE (1988).
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safety standards on the set had been violated. Yet which of the men
on trial were responsible? After the jury acquitted all five men, one
deputy district attorney acknowledged the difficulty of proving that
individual filmmakers met the gross, wanton, and reckless conduct
necessary for a manslaughter conviction.
These were clean-cut individuals--at least for the most part clean-cut-who
were trying to make an honest living. The question is, can you prove that they
went over the line of legitimacy and respectability? Our point of view is that
employers do have a responsibility to their employees. It was our feeling here
that we were talking about criminal responsibility ... We were dealing with
something we believe was foreseeable.... But most jurors do not want to
convict someone for nonintentional harm.102
Jurors interviewed after the trial said that even though the defend-
ants were not guiltless, the criteria for involuntary manslaughter sim-
ply had not been met.103 But they also wondered why the man who
had actually set off the fatal explosives that derailed the helicopter
had been granted immunity rather than prosecuted. Jurors thought
that "he was at least as guilty as the others."104 The jurors' difficulty
points out the problems in determining responsibility when tasks are
hierarchically divided.
Psychological theory provides relatively few insights into the fac-
tors affecting judgments of the responsibility of groups. Much re-
search in the subfield of attribution theory, the study of judgments of
causality and responsibility, has focused on how individuals perceive
and evaluate the responsibility of other individuals rather than
groups. 0 5 One exception is recent work on category perception,
which examines how people perceive social groups. However, this
work has to date been oriented around issues of intergroup bias and
racial and gender discrimination rather than issues relating to judg-
ments of group responsibility.10 6
Psychological experiments have examined how the behaviors and
responsibilities of individuals change when they are in groups. For
example, one of the classic studies in social psychology demonstrated
that responsibility often dissipates within a group context, a phenome-
non labeled "diffusion of responsibility."107 This lesser sense of re-
sponsibility can have a range of discernible consequences. Early work
showed that bystanders are less likely to help others in emergencies
102. Id. at 331.
103. Id. at 324.
104. Id. at 322.
105. ATrIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR (E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H.
Kelley, R. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner ed. 1972); K. SHAVER, supra note 70.
106. Wilder, Social Categorization.. Implications for Creation and Reduction of Inter-
group Bias, in 19 ADvANCEs IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY (L. Berkowitz
ed. 1986).
107. Darley & Latane, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsi-
bility, 8 J. PERsONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 377 (1968).
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when they are in groups.10s Later studies demonstrated that people
tend to contribute less and perform less assiduously in groups, particu-
larly if their contributions are not identifiable. 109 As the relationship
between individual input and group outcomes decreases, it is more dif-
ficult to determine who did what and thus who deserves reward or
punishment. Individuals are less likely to loaf in groups when they
believe that their contributions are identifiable, can make a noticeable
difference, or are indispensable.11o
The implications of this work for judgments of group and corporate
responsibility have not been systematically developed. One might
surmise that clearly identifiable lines of authority and responsibility
spelled out in corporate charters would counteract potential diffusion
of responsibility. If, however, lines of authority and official responsi-
bility for a particular negative outcome are shared or unclear, diffu-
sion of responsibility is likely to result. Perhaps this helps to explain
the observation of many organizational sociologists that corporate
wrongdoing is not adequately sanctioned because blame is diffused
among members of the organization and consequently disappears."'
In trying to explain judgments of responsibility in situations gov-
erned by authority, Herbert Kelman and Lee Hamilton noted that the
traditional psychological models developed by attribution theorists did
not seem to adequately capture the forces at work in hierarchically
organized social structures.112 As Kelman and Hamilton discuss, the
relationships among authorities and subordinates within an organiza-
tion fundamentally affect judgments of responsibility."13 In hierarchi-
cal organizations, authorities possess the right to give orders, but also
retain responsibility for the consequences of actions that they have or-
dered. Subordinates have a duty to obey orders, but accompanying
this duty is a corresponding right to expect that authorities will take
108. Id.
109. Latane, supra note 84. Psychologists have dubbed the motivational losses and
performance decrements in groups "social loafing" or "free rider" effects. A
number of interesting studies of the parameters and determinants of these effects
have been conducted. See, e.g., Kerr & Brunn, Dispensability of Member EZffort
and Group Motivation Losses: Free Rider Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsY-
CHOLOGY 78 (1983)(demonstrating that group members show less motivation as
their efforts are perceived to be less critical for group success); Kerr, Motivation
Losses in Small Groups: A Social Dilemma Analysis, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 819 (1983)(analyzing free rider, social loafing, and sucker effects).
110. Kerr & Brunn, supra note 109. For an application of social loafing theory to judi-
cial decision making, see Luskin, Social Loafing on the Bench- The Case of Calen-
dars and Caseloads, 12 JusT. Sys. J. 177 (1987).
111. M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, supra note 89. See also K. BRICKEY, supra note 2, at
99-150 (discussing the problem of ascertaining responsibility within corporate
organizations).
112. H. KELMAN & V. HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE 199 (1989).
113. Id.
[Vol. 69:158
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
the responsibility should negative outcomes result from the subordi-
nates' actions performed under orders.1 14 Expectations for the
subordinate are often clear, making it obvious when the subordinate
has complied or failed to comply with orders. For a subordinate fol-
lowing an order from a higher-up, the obligation to follow the order
should reduce attributed responsibility, since the presence of external
demands generally reduces judgments of individual responsibility."5
The superior's role, however, possesses a different set of expecta-
tions and a distinct rule for responsibility. Kelman and Hamilton ar-
gue that superiors are judged by more diffuse, standards than
subordinates. They must take responsibility for the actions of their
subordinates. They are expected to supervise others with "care,"
"good sense," and similar qualities that have no clear referents."16
Thus, "[a]uthority is associated with relatively strict liability for rela-
tively diffuse expectations."" 7 Kelman and Hamilton's arguments
might seem to suggest that people in positions of authority are attrib-
uted more responsibility for untoward consequences of group actions.
However, as they note, because it is more difficult to determine when
standards have been violated, the very diffuseness of the expectations
of superiors may protect them when it comes to sanctioning."18 Some
support for this may be found in the status liability effect, which holds
that higher status offenders are sanctioned more severely than lower
status offenders when the violation is extreme, but the reverse is true
for moderate violations.119 In a mock juror study using college stu-
dents as subjects, Rosoff varied the status of a criminal defendant (sur-
geon/dermatologist) and the nature of the offense (murder/Medicaid
fraud). Consistent with the status liability hypothesis, he discovered
that subjects were more likely to convict the surgeon than the derma-
tologist of murder, but recommended fewer penalties for the surgeon
than the dermatologist for Medicaid fraud.120 Thus under some cir-
114. Id. at 55. The rights to give and obey orders are, of course, not absolute, but are
limited to legitimate orders. See U.S. v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742 (1954)(a Korean
War case in which a senior officer ordered a junior officer to commit a war crime
by killing an innocent citizen).
115. K. SHAVER, supra note 70, at 109-11, 149-51.
116. H. KELMAN & V. HAMILTON, supra note 112, at 202-04.
117. Id. at 204.
118. '"Bureaucrats and professionals may be normatively bound to higher, diffuse, and
forward-looking standards, but there is an escape hatch involved in such stan-
dards. Just as it may be difficult to say when they have been met, it is correspond-
ingly difficult to say when they have been seriously violated." Id.
119. Rosoff, Physicians as Criminal Defendants: Specialty, Sanctions, and Status Lia-
bility, 13 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 231 (1989).
120. Id. Although these results are consistent with the status liability hypothesis, it
should be noted that subjects were asked to decide guilt in the severe deviance
case and punishment in the moderate deviance case, creating a potential
confound.
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cumstances, high status individuals in authority roles within business
organizations may benefit from ambiguity about responsibility.
Kelman and Hamilton's model of responsibility judgments in hier-
archical settings, initially developed to account for crimes of obedience
in a military context, provides an excellent framework for thinking
about norms and legal rules governing responsibility within business/
corporate groups. The generalizability of Kelman and Hamilton's the-
oretical propositions can be tested by examining judgments of legal
responsibility for individuals at different levels in the hierarchy of a
business organization.
E. Toward a Model of Judgments of Corporate Responsibility
This review of research and theory suggests that a number of psy-
chological factors may influence judgments of corporate responsibil-
ity. These factors are integrated into a tentative model of the
judgment process. See Figure 1. The model contains several of the
attitudinal variables previously discussed, including general attitudes
toward businesses and corporations as well as specific attitudes toward
a particular corporation, which may be based on its size, reputation,
products, or other characteristics. In line with work on the relation-
ship between attitudes and behavior, i21 general and specific attitudes
are likely to have at best modest effects on corporate wrongdoing
which should be evidenced primarily in cases in which the attitudinal
content is relevant to the judgment of wrongdoing (as in the ethics
and fraud example given above).' 22 Corporate resources, displayed as
a separate influence, include both financial and nonfinancial re-
sources, consistent with the impact of both types of resources on judg-
ments of culpability in prior work. Attitudes toward personal or social
responsibility are shown as influencing the evaluation of evidence
both directly and indirectly, via judgments of the plaintiff's or the vic-
tim's fault, a linkage that is evident from prior research.
The attitudinal and resource factors are displayed as affecting judg-
ments of corporate responsibility by initially influencing the evalua-
tion of causation and fault evidence in the case. This presumption is
based on research showing that observers' perceptions of trial evi-
dence are the key mediators and determinants of their judgments of
culpability.123
121. I. AJzEN & M. FISHBEIN, supra note 42.
122. See suprm notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
123. Tanford has presented survey data showing that demographic and attitudinal fac-
tors often functioned indirectly through the evaluation of evidence rather than as
direct impacts on trial verdicts. Tanford, Survey Research and Jury Selection,
paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Associa-
tion, New Orleans, Louisiana (1989). Pennington & Hastie have proposed a story
model of juror decision making, arguing that jurors first organize relevant evi-
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In considering the evaluation of responsibility of an individual
working in a corporation, these factors are joined by an additional va-
riable-the individual's role within the corporation. This relationship
accords with research findings by Kelman and Hamilton showing the
strong influence of role and authority on judgments of
responsibility 2 4
This psychological model is necessarily incomplete and speculative.
Most importantly, and by design, it focuses on the psychological fac-
tors influencing the judgment process rather than evidence, legal
rules, judicial instructions, and other fundamental elements that are
necessary to legally link an individual or a corporation to harmful ac-
tions. These are now represented only indirectly, through the observ-
ers' subjective evaluations of causation and fault evidence. Also
ignored for the moment are the potential influences of the type of vio-
lation and nature of the complaint being considered. For instance, it is
possible that cases involving business-business disputes do not evoke
the same kinds of attitudinal influences as do individual-business dis-
putes, or that attitudes toward business are important in personal in-
jury and antitrust cases but not contract disagreements. The lack of
sufficient information about the potential impact of these factors
makes it impossible to speculate about their impact on judgments of
corporate responsibility. As work in this area continues to grow, a
more complete model of the judgment process can be anticipated.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Unanswered Questions about Judgments of Corporate Responsibility
This article has described the shift toward holding corporate and
business entities culpable for harm, and has outlined factors affecting
lay attributions of responsibility. The proposed model of judgments of
corporate responsibility, developed on the basis of existing knowledge,
can be tested by research that examines the links among the various
psychological factors and responsibility judgments.
More questions have been raised than answered in this review, by
reflecting the rudimentary state of scientific research on judgments of
corporate responsibility. Clearly we need to know far more about the
entire process of business disputing and the issues about business and
corporate responsibility that are most frequently adjudicated by the
dence into a coherent story, then match the story to the verdict category with the
closest fit. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision-Ma.-
ing, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 242 (1986). See generally S. KASSIN
& L. WRIGmsMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PRocEDuRE 8-9
(1985)(arguing that despite much psychological research on extra-legal variables,
the evidence and courtroom procedure remain the most crucial determinants of
trial outcomes).
124. Supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
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courts. At the University of Wisconsin, a research project examining
business disputing is currently underway, and promises to provide
more information about businesses' contemporary use of the courts.'2M
This type of work can help shape systematic research on corporate
responsibility by alerting researchers to the most important issues in
business law.
This review indicates that people have complex and sometimes ap-
parently contradictory views of business. We need to begin to take a
closer look at the multidimensionality of attitudes toward business
rather than operating on the assumption that there exists a unitary
continuum of pro-business/anti-business sentiment. It would also be
useful to develop a "taxonomy" of corporations, and to determine
what features-size, profit status, product type, reputation--affect
judgments of responsibility.
As for other attitudes that affect judgments of corporate responsi-
bility, the strong tensions between personal and social responsibility
attributions deserve further investigation. What life history, demo-
graphic, and attitudinal factors predispose people to adopt a social re-
sponsibility perspective in judging causality? What kinds of situations
and types of cases are most likely to elicit such judgments? There is
evidence that at least some of the populace directs feelings of hostility
against those who bring personal injury lawsuits. Are there
equivalent animosities in other types of cases, and do they affect peo-
ple's willingness to hold business accountable?
We still do not know exactly why people adopt a seemingly distinc-
tive standard for corporate as opposed to individual responsibility.12 6
Future research varying the defendant's identity can gauge the gener-
alizability and contours of the phenomenon and determine the causes
of differential responding.
I concur with Kelman and Hamilton's observation that contempo-
rary psychological theory about judgments of responsibility within hi-
erarchical contexts needs further development.127 Systematic analysis
of corporate responsibility judgments can make a contribution not
only to the law and society field but also to basic theory in social, orga-
nizational, and political psychology. Collective responsibility issues
arise with a variety of groups and organizations, such as governments,
political parties, voluntary associations, and even the Mafia. Further-
more, the responsibility of groups is an important matter in the crimi-
nal justice system in cases involving conspiracy, complicity, and
125. Galanter, Macaulay, Palay, & Rogers, The Transformation of American Business
Disputing (Disputes Processing Research Program, University of Wisconsin, Jan.
5, 1989)(unpublished manuscript).
126. Id. at § BI.
127. Supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
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accessories to crime. 28 Thus the study of reactions to corporate
wrongdoing has the potential for broader significance and increased
understanding of views of collective responsibility in these other
contexts.
B. New Directions for Psycholegal Research
This article has focused on the dynamics of lay judgments of corpo-
rate responsibility. However, it is worth concluding the article with
the observation that the general topics of corporate and business law
constitute a rich lode of research questions and ideas. Many of these
issues have clear psychological content or implications, but most have
yet to be systematically examined by psycholegal researchers.
General theory about human behavior may provide a useful back-
ground for considering the appropriateness and efficacy of legal rules
and regulations governing corporations. The effective deterrence of
corporate misconduct, now being studied by legal scholars and sociolo-
gists, could be enhanced by the application of psychological theory.12 9
Tomkins, Victor, and Adler analyzed corporate decision making about
high risk projects using insights about risk judgments and decision
making derived from extensive research in social, cognitive, and orga-
nizational psychology.130 They concluded that this research base
could be useful in helping to regulate corporate risk. Psychological
theory may also be used to improve resolution of business disputes.
For instance, procedural justice principles have been employed to de-
velop methods for business negotiation and the handling of consumer
complaints.' 3 '
In addition to these more general uses of psychological theory, ex-
perimental research techniques may also be used directly by the
courts to evaluate the competing claims of parties. Diamond em-
ployed systematic research techniques to test parties' claims in decep-
tive advertising cases.132 She presented different versions of a
commercial advertisement to different groups of subjects, compared
their understanding of the product, and concluded that the ad in ques-
tion was deceptive in its impact. Glucksburg has drawn on cognitive
128. J. KAPLAN & &. WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AD MATERIALS 577-749
(1986).
129. See, ag., J. BRAiTHWArr , CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); J.
BRArrHwArrE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY
(1985); B. FWSE & J. BRAITHwArT, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE
OFFENDERS (1983).
130. Tomkins, Victor, & Adler, Psycholegal Aspects of Organizational Behavior As-
sessing and Controlling Risk, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw (D.
Kagehiro & W. Laufer ed. in press).
131. E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUsTICE (1988).
132. Diamond, Using Psychology to Control Law: From Deceptive Advertising to
Criminal Sentencing, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 239 (1989).
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
theory and research to examine the adequacy of warnings about po-
tentially harmful products. He has used this research base in testify-
ing as an expert about the adequacy of product warnings in specific
civil cases.133
Other corporate law matters are frequent subjects of judicial opin-
ions and law review articles, but their social science aspects remain
virtually unexplored. One such issue has to do with the court's reli-
ance and scrutiny of business decisions by corporate boards of direc-
tors. The chair of the board of directors of a company may appoint a
subcommittee of independent directors, that is, board members who
are not directly involved in company management, to provide an in-
dependent evaluation of the wisdom of a merger, the merits of share-
holder litigation, or other key business questions. The presumption is
that directors without a direct financial stake in the company are bet-
ter able to serve the corporations and shareholders' interests. But just
how independent can they be? Psychological research on group rela-
tions indicates that members of continuing and closely knit groups
sometimes have difficulty expressing views that are contrary to those
of the group leader or the majority of other group members.134 Cox
and Munsinger reviewed the psychological research on group attach-
ment and concluded that it gave cause for concern about the presumed
independence of "independent" board members. 35 Various tech-
niques can be used to counteract tendencies toward group bias, indicat-
ing the potential effectiveness of remedial action.
133. Glucksburg, On Expert Testimony: Risk Information and Warning Signs, talk
presented at Proseminar in Psychology and Law, Stanford University, Stanford,
California (Nov. 18, 1986).
134. I. JANIs, GRouPrHINx (2d ed. 1982). Janis coined the term "groupthink" to de-
scribe tendencies toward conformity in groups that lead to underestimates of risk
of preferred alternatives. See also I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING (1977).
135. Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:. Psychological Foundations and Legal
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEmp. PRoBs. 83 (1985). Cox
and Munsinger focused on the impact of such biases on special litigation commit-
tees, composed of independent directors, which are charged with evaluating de-
rivative lawsuits against their colleagues on the board. They write that-
several social-psychological mechanisms ... can generate bias in the di-
rectors' assessment of the suit, including biases established by appoint-
ment of members to the board or a special litigation committee, control
of pecuniary or nonpecuniary rewards made available to the independ-
ent directors by the defendant members of the board of directors, the
independent directors' prior associations with the defendants, and their
common cultural and social heritages. We conclude that, in combination,
these several psychological mechanisms can be expected to generate sub-
tle, but powerful, biases which result in the independent directors'
reaching a decision insulating colleagues on the board from legal
sanctions.
Id. at 84-85. The implications of the psychological literature research they cite
clearly extend beyond the consideration of litigation committees and derivative
lawsuits, to other types of cases in which the courts consider directors' decisions.
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One highly visible business law issue is the existence of corporate
takeovers, including hostile takeovers in which a company's managers
attempt to resist the takeover attempt of another company. 3 6 Econo-
mists and business analysts routinely provide projections about the
impact of potential takeovers on stock prices and corporate debt.
These projections could be supplemented by judgments of social scien-
tists and organizational scholars about the social impact on the com-
pany to create a fuller picture of the consequences of such business
actions. Research on group processes and psychological studies of
group mergers, for example, could be used to help predict the poten-
tial impact of a takeover on the functioning of the combined com-
pany. 3 7 Another factor that a court might consider is whether a
particular takeover would have deleterious impact on the corporate or
organizational culture.13 8
These examples are far from systematic. Even so, they point to
some of the ways in which psycholegal research could contribute to
136. See generally R. HAMITON, CORPoRATIONs 776-858 (3d. ed. 1986).
137. Gaertner & Dovidio, Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism: Problems, Progress,
and Promise, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RAcIsM 315, 326 (S. Gaertner
& J. Dovidio ed. 1986), citing, Schoennauer, Behavior Patterns of Executives in
Business Acquisitions, PERS. ADMIN., Jan./Feb. 1967, at 22, in which:
[s]uccessful mergers were associated with an integration pattern in
which in the first stage the two management teams joined together with-
out either company being required to conform to the style of the other,
followed by a second stage in which the merged company developed a
culture that represented a blend of the two corporate cultures or com-
bined each into a pattern in which new values, norms, and procedures
emerged.
138. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. [and related cases], C.A. No. 10866,
Del. Ch. (July 14, 1989) (Allen, C.). Chancellor Allen wrote:
[Very important to Time management and its board] has been a desire to
maintain an independent Time Inc. that reflected a continuation of what
management and the board regarded as distinctive and important 'Time
culture.' This culture appears in part to be pride in the history of the
firm-notably Time Magazine and its role in American life-and in part
a managerial philosophy and distinctive structure that is intended to pro-
tect journalistic integrity from pressures from the business side of the
enterprise.... [P]laintiffs in this suit dismiss this claim of 'culture' as
being nothing more than a desire to perpetuate or entrench existing
management disguised in a pompous, highfalutin' claim. I understand
the argument and recognize the risk of cheap deception that would be
entailed in a broad and indiscriminate recognition of 'corporate culture'
as a valid interest that would justify a board in taking steps to defeat a
non-coercive tender offer. Every reconfiguration of assets, every funda-
mental threat to the status quo, represents a threat to an existing corpo-
rate culture. But I am not persuaded that there may not be instances in
which the law might recognize as valid a perceived threat to a 'corporate
culture' that is shown to be palpable (for lack of a better word), distinc-
tive and advantageous.
Id. at 9-10.
For a review of psychological theory and research on organizational culture,
see SCHEIN, Organizational Culture, 45 AM. PsYCHOLOGIsT 109 (1990).
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greater understanding of the impact and operation of business and cor-
porate law. The psycholegal field stands to benefit as well. A number
of commentators have critically noted that to date most psychology-
law research has examined a relatively narrow range of criminal law
topics.3 9 Expanding the subject matter of our inquiry to include busi-
ness and corporate law issues would enrich our grasp of the multiplic-
ity of ways that law affects society.
139. Melton, The Signtifcance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and Families,
22 GA. L. REV. 851 (1988); Saks, The Law Does Not Live by Eyewitness Testimony
Alone, 10 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 279 (1986); Tapp, Psychologists and the Law: Who
Needs Whom?, in 2 APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY ANN. 263 (L. Bickman ed. 1981).
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